
Labels: Bayou Group, Daniel Marino, Matthew Marino, Sam Israel
Labels: Bayou Group, Fraud, hedge fund, Hennessee, Kroll, Sam Israel
Labels: Bayou Group, hedge fund, Sam Israel
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Fund investors turn to private investigatorsThe full article appears here.
Risk Magazine
November 2005
By Jayne Jung
The recent to turn to private investigators to dig deeper into fund managers and to conduct due diligence
A spate of hedge fund-related scandals in recent months has increased concern among investors about fraud, and is prompting many to turn to private investigators to dig deeper into fund managers and to conduct due diligence. "What's going on with Bayou, Refco and Man Financial makes people nervous. And nervous people call investigators," says Michael Thomas, a partner at Caveat, a Washington DC-based corporate investigation firm...
...Caveat's Thomas says investors' focus is broader than the financial markets when making investment decisions, and with good reason. Something as simple as a driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs charge might cause investors to withdraw cash from a fund manager, he says. Investors don't want there to be any kind of question mark hanging over the integrity, or principles, of a manager.
Labels: Bayou Group, Kroll, Refco
Deadline looms as SEC turns screw on hedge fundsThe original article appears here.
By Andrew Parker in New York,
Stephen Schurr in London and
Francesco Guerrera in Hong Kong
The Financial Times
The chief US financial regulator is flexing its muscles again, both at home and abroad. The Securities and Exchange Commission has set a deadline of Wednesday for many US and foreign hedge fund managers to register with it. They must provide the regulator with information about their businesses and brace themselves for the possibility of inspections.
The extension of the SEC's supervisory work to hedge funds, where wealthy investors put their money, represents a big expansion of its powers and responsibilities. However, intense controversy and uncertainty surrounds the regulator's flagship project. A federal appeals court was asked in December to strike down the SEC's rule requiring hedge fund managers who advise more than 14 investors to register with the regulator.
Phillip Goldstein, a New York-based hedge fund manager, says he is "cautiously optimistic" that the court will support his argument that the SEC did not have the authority to draw up the rule in October 2004.
William Donaldson, the SEC's Republican chairman at the time, had to rely on the support of the regulator's two Democratic commissioners to get the rule approved. He insisted the rule was necessary for the SEC to gain a full understanding of the traditionally secretive hedge fund industry, which controls assets worth $1,200bn. More than 1,000 hedge fund managers had registered with the SEC before the rule was approved. Some did so voluntarily, while others had to if they were advisers to mutual funds, for example.
But the SEC estimated that a further 1,000 hedge fund managers would have to register following the rule. Mr Donaldson said the growth of hedge funds had been accompanied by increasing instances of fraud. He highlighted 51 SEC investigations into hedge fund managers accused of fraud between 1999 and 2004. Since then the SEC has brought a further 30 cases, including against Samuel Israel III, founder of the Bayou group of hedge funds, where investors had put $450m.
The tabular content relating to this article is not available to view. Apologies in advance for the inconvenience caused.Today, concerns about the SEC's registration rule focus on compliance costs, and the risk they will be passed on to investors in the guise of reduced returns. Hedge fund managers, for example, must appoint chief compliance officers at their businesses. But Ernst & Young, the accountants, last month published a survey of 109 managers that found 85 per cent thought the annual costs to be $500,000 or less, which was "generally below market projections".
Some hedge fund managers appear to be taking steps to avoid having to register with the SEC by Wednesday. Managers do not have to register if after February 1 they do not take additional money from existing clients or accept contributions from new investors. They also do not have register if they bar clients from withdrawing their investments for more than two years.
SEC officials say the UK and Hong Kong are the most significant overseas jurisdictions for hedge fund managers. By the end of last Thursday, 113 hedge fund managers based outside the US were registered with the SEC. Of these, 68 are in the UK and seven are in Hong Kong.
In London, some hedge fund managers regard the SEC's oversight as unwarranted, given that the Financial Services Authority, the chief UK financial regulator, scrutinises their industry. "Outside the US, the feeling is that the FSA is completely on top of hedge funds, far more than anyone else in the world," says Philippe Bonnefoy, partner at Cedar Partners, a London-based fund that invests in hedge funds.
In Hong Kong, hedge fund managers say they expect the bigger players to register with the SEC, partly because it would help them improve their image. "They may not like it but they have little choice if they want to continue to attract US investors and not raise suspicions in the eyes of regulators," says the Hong Kong-based manager of a large hedge fund.
Labels: Bayou Group, Financial Services Authority
Labels: Bayou Group, Gradient Analytics, Patrick Byrne
Appeals Judges Question SEC's Hedge Fund RuleThe original article appears here.
By Carrie Johnson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, December 10, 2005; D01
Appeals court judges sharply questioned yesterday whether the Securities and Exchange Commission had a reasonable basis for adopting a controversial rule that requires hedge funds to register with the agency.
A divided SEC passed the rule in a 3 to 2 vote last year, citing evidence that the loosely regulated investment pools had become a breeding ground for fraud and trading abuses. But New York fund adviser Phillip Goldstein sued to stop the rule, arguing that the SEC had overstepped its authority and did not provide adequate foundation for the move.
Goldstein's case appeared to get a boost yesterday based on questions from two of the three judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit panel.
"You don't have authority to act simply because you exist," Judge Harry T. Edwards told Jacob H. Stillman, the SEC's lawyer.
A few moments later, Edwards said: "We have to test your thesis, and your thesis doesn't hold up."
Judge A. Raymond Randolph also expressed skepticism about the agency's arguments.
Legal experts cautioned that it is difficult to draw conclusions about how a court will rule based on questions asked by judges during oral arguments. The appeals court, however, has criticized the SEC's approach in a few recent cases.
Earlier this year, the court sent back for more research a rule mandating that mutual fund board chairmen be independent of management. The SEC retooled the rule, prompting a second, pending legal challenge by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. That case is to be argued Jan. 6.
Last month, the court rejected a separate bid by agency lawyers to impose financial penalties on board members at an investment fund called the Rockies Fund Inc., ruling that the agency had levied the fines "arbitrarily and capriciously."
Former SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson made the hedge fund effort one of his central initiatives before he resigned in June. In recent years, the market has boomed to include more than 8,000 funds with over $1 trillion in assets. Average investors and pension funds increasingly are investing in the funds.
From 1999 to 2004, the agency filed 51 fraud cases involving hedge funds. Last week, Millennium Partners LP, a highflying New York fund, agreed to pay $180 million to settle trading abuse allegations lodged by the SEC and New York state Attorney General Eliot L. Spitzer. In September, two top officers at the Bayou Management fund pleaded guilty to criminal charges for engaging in a fraud that cost investors $450 million.
Stillman, the SEC's lawyer, stressed to the appeals court yesterday that the agency moved to register funds with more than 14 investors and $25 million under management to further its mission of protecting investors.
"Aren't they really getting at trying to enhance the government's ability to identify and prosecute fraud when it occurs?" Judge Thomas B. Griffith asked a lawyer for Goldstein. "That's really what's at the core of this."
The rule is set to take effect in February. Critics fear the hedge fund rule could foreshadow inspections and other efforts to rein in the funds. Before it was adopted, the plan had been criticized by Treasury Secretary John W. Snow and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, among others.
A ruling is expected within the next several months, according Philip D. Bartz, a lawyer at McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP who represents Goldstein.
Labels: Bayou Group, Eliot Spitzer, New York AG
Regulators May Never Police Hedge Fund ConflictsIndeed. Much more of interest in the full piece, regarding the February '06 hedge fund SEC filing deadline and the hurdles that still remain for the SEC before it can perform an adequate job in policing funds.
By John Wasik
November 28, 2005
Bloomberg
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is trying hard not to look like the bumbling film detective Inspector Clouseau in advance of its hedge-fund registration deadline in February. Already managers of the 8,000 funds that control $1 trillion in assets have found ways of avoiding registration. And it's unlikely the agency's inspection of the advisers will be too extensive, either.
As with many other investment products, you will have to be your own cop to ferret out conflicts at hedge funds and funds of funds, which package several hedge products. "Conflicts of interest -- they're everywhere,'' said Gene Gohlke, associate director of the SEC's Office of Compliance Inspection, who was speaking at a Fund of Funds Forum in New York on Nov. 14. "And they're particularly prevalent in the investment advisory business.''
The SEC is being honest about its inability to adequately supervise a huge, growing and sometimes unruly industry... The agency will only be able to conduct 1,200 to 1,500 inspections a year with 450 staff members. This team also tries to monitor 8,000 mutual funds from 1,000 fund groups... The odds are against the SEC collaring the next Bayou Capital, a $440 million hedge fund that collapsed in August and is under investigation for fraud...
You needn't be discouraged by the regulatory gap and can hire someone to be your watchdog... Hiring someone like an accountant, lawyer or financial planner to vet funds or funds of funds for you makes eminent sense... Some oversight of hedge funds is better than none, although the way the system is now, you will have much better protection if you do it yourself or hire someone akin to a private eye.
Labels: Bayou Group
Fund investors turn to private investigatorsThe full article appears here.
Risk Magazine
November 2005
By Jayne Jung
The recent to turn to private investigators to dig deeper into fund managers and to conduct due diligence
A spate of hedge fund-related scandals in recent months has increased concern among investors about fraud, and is prompting many to turn to private investigators to dig deeper into fund managers and to conduct due diligence. "What's going on with Bayou, Refco and Man Financial makes people nervous. And nervous people call investigators," says Michael Thomas, a partner at Caveat, a Washington DC-based corporate investigation firm...
...Caveat's Thomas says investors' focus is broader than the financial markets when making investment decisions, and with good reason. Something as simple as a driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs charge might cause investors to withdraw cash from a fund manager, he says. Investors don't want there to be any kind of question mark hanging over the integrity, or principles, of a manager.
Labels: Bayou Group, Refco
Hedge Fund SleuthsRead on, here....or save time and just give Caveat a call.
November 21, 2005
Business Week
"For sizable fees, they put secretive investment partnerships under a microscope"
The recent high-profile blowups of two hedge funds, Bayou Management and Wood River Capital Management, have raised an important question: What can hedge fund investors do to avoid getting burned by unscrupulous managers? The answer: Quite a bit, as long as you're willing to spend time or money vetting these investments...
Labels: Bayou Group, John Whittier, Wood River Capital
Firm that pitched Bayou facing questions - After hedge fund blowup, advisory firm says it might have acted differently; others also under fire.Extensive additional details in the full article.
November 7, 2005
By Amanda Cantrell
CNN/Money, staff writer
NEW YORK (CNN/Money) - Hedge fund advisor Hennessee Group recommended Bayou to its clients. Now it's being sued. The firm says it regrets steering clients to Bayou but had reason to think at the time the hedge fund was legitimate.
Bayou's founder and CFO pleaded guilty nearly six weeks ago to charges that they raised more than $450 million from investors, lied about the fund's returns and formed a phony accounting firm to audit the firm's results.
Hennessee Group admits it should have done a better job of spotting red flags at Bayou, including the fact that Bayou wasn't using a well-known auditor. Hennessee recently spoke out about Bayou, acknowledging that the firm didn't catch the fraud, but defended its review process nonetheless.
"I can see why, in hindsight, it might seem like this was all very obvious, but it's important to realize how it appears when you are going through it real time," Leeana Piscopo, senior vice president and chief compliance officer at Hennessee, said in an interview...
Labels: Bayou Group
Hedge fund fraud less likely in Europe than U.SOriginal article appears here.
Reuters
November 4, 2005
By Pratima DesaiLONDON - The risk that hedge funds will defraud investors is lower in Europe than in the United States, because most European hedge funds turn to independent administrators to value their books, hedge fund analysts said.
A lack of independent valuations contributed to the high-profile failure earlier this year of the U.S.-based Bayou Group hedge fund. Its founder and chief executive pleaded guilty to fraud by misrepresenting the value of assets, in a scheme prosecutors said cost investors $450 million.
"You should be wary of self-administered funds ... That's where the danger is," said Derek Stewart, a director of Mellon Global Alternative Investments.
In Europe there have been no major failures in recent years, because hedge funds normally use independent administrators, even though it is not a legal requirement. Over the years it has become a standard industry practice, which investors have come to expect.
"Hedge funds outside the United States without independent fund administrators are unlikely to have any serious investors," said Joe Seet, senior partner at Sigma Partnership, a specialist hedge fund advisory firm.
"Most hedge funds that collapse do not have fund administrators that are truly independent," he added.
The reputation of an independent administrator is also important, and that means being registered with a local regulator. In Dublin, for example, analysts estimate there are close to 40 fund administrators and that all are registered with Ireland's central bank. Hedge funds based in Asia have in the main taken their cue from Europe and use independent administrators to value their books, analysts say.
STARTING TO CHANGE
In the United States, new SEC rules requiring most hedge funds to be registered by February 2006 mean that funds are starting to change the way their books are valued and that more are turning to independent administrators. But many U.S. independent administrators do not yet have the specialist resources to properly value complex derivatives in hedge fund portfolios.
"Most of the really big hedge funds are still U.S.-based, and they are becoming more sensitive to issues about independent (valuations) ... independent fund directors and corporate governance," Seet said. Investors in hedge funds that trade liquid markets such as listed securities, government bonds or foreign exchange have less cause for worry.
Examples include managed futures funds that trade exchange-traded futures and equity funds that buy and sell stocks on major stock markets in London, New York or Tokyo, where prices are transparent and easily available.
Problems normally arise in less liquid instruments for which prices can be more easily manipulated, which include over-the-counter derivatives such as options, convertible bonds, private equity investments or loans.
"Valuation becomes more important with funds who have illiquid assets," said Doug Fulton, a principal at Westhall Capital. "If there is any reliance upon the fund manager for valuations or on (one) mainstream market source (bank or broker), then it's opaque."
Labels: Bayou Group
Scandals make hedge fund sleuthing pay off -expertsThe original article appears here.
October 12, 2005
By Svea Herbst-BaylissBOSTON - Back-to-back hedge fund scandals are sending investors a frightening message: Spend a few thousand dollars now to sidestep a multimillion-dollar fraud later. Lawyers and investigators said this week that the collapse of hedge fund Bayou Group and suspected fraud at hedge fund Wood River Partners likely will prompt investors to take more precautions before stepping into the fast-growing $1 trillion industry.
"The circle of who has gotten burned is getting bigger and the trend is that people will ask for more due diligence because they realize it pays to conduct these inquiries," said Peter Turecek, who manages the hedge fund business at Kroll, a New York-based security consulting firm. Financial regulators are sorting out what went wrong at Bayou, where investors are said to have lost $300 million, and Wood River, which once said it was managing $500 million.
Investors and lawyers have not been able to reach Wood River in the last few days, and in a lawsuit filed by Lehman Brothers against Wood River, the Wall Street investment bank said that it suspected the hedge fund ceased operating. Wood River is under investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
These are the latest blowups in an industry that has attracted billions of dollars from pension funds, endowments and charities since becoming a hot asset class by delivering outsized returns in the late 1990s and positive returns during the stock market's almost three-year sojourn in bear territory.
Many investors, particularly funds of funds like Glenwood Capital Investments and Mesirow Financial that select hedge fund portfolios, already rely on investigators to snoop around and verify a manager really is who he says he is. For fees ranging between $2,000 and $50,000, firms will compile dossiers that can turn up anything from unpaid parking tickets to lawsuits to lies on resumes.
"Getting reports on managers shows that for $2,000 up front, you can avoid people like this instead of having to spend hundreds of times that amount to recoup millions of dollars in losses later," said Randy Shain, executive vice president of First Advantage CoreFacts LLC, which investigates hedge funds. "It is cheap insurance," he added.
Still, there are plenty of investors who pick managers based on a gut feeling and who consider due diligence a cost -- heaped on top of hedge funds' already hefty fees -- that is not part of their investment, lawyers and investigators said. But these are the people who might come around now, they added. "Every time there is a fraud, investors profess to do more due diligence and this is no different," said Scott Berman, a partner at law firm Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman.
Those who still trust their gut may change their minds after hearing what firms like First Advantage CoreFacts turned up. This summer, a report on Wood River founder John Whittier showed the former technology analyst faced four tax liens, was sued for not paying rent and was sued for $1.6 million in securities losses, Shain said. His clients passed on Whittier. "Taken together, these three things added up to a red flag," Shain said, explaining that "the report shows Whittier ran out of money or that he's sloppy. Neither inspires confidence."
Fact checking also turned up discrepancies on Bayou founder Samuel Israel's resume when Shain's analysts tracked down the hedge fund manager's former employer, Leon Cooperman, who said he hadn't been head trader and wasn't there for four years.
As investors burned by these blowups wait to recoup money, the trend will be for people to spend a premium on "reputational reviews" that highlight behavior patterns which could become a liability later, investigators said. "People will want to know that the person is a good trader, but they'll also want to hear if the guy heads off to the bar and drinks all night every night," Kroll's Turecek said.
Looking ahead, investors also are likely to press for more clarity on operational matters like who checked the books after Bayou fabricated a firm to certify its returns. "We were able to discover that Bayou's auditor was bullshit," Shain said. This week, Reuters reported that Wood River told potential investors it had retained two firms as independent auditors. But those auditors on Tuesday denied any relationship with the controversial hedge fund.
Labels: Bayou Group, John Whittier, Kroll, Milberg, Wood River Capital
Another Fishy Hedge FundThis is just the start of quite the lengthy article and one well-worth reading. The full version can be found here, courtesy of BusinessWeek.com.
October 13, 2005
By Justin Hibbard and Adrienne Carter
Business Week
A mysterious money manager, nonstop hype, plunging returns, empty offices, and now an SEC probe -- the intrigue at Wood River deepens.
Ketchum, Idaho, is the kind of place where people tend to know each other. Close to the Sun Valley ski resort, the tony town of 3,873 boasts several Wall Street refugees who manage money for wealthy neighbors and clients elsewhere. Yet few residents say they know John Whittier, a 39-year-old money manager who moved to the area about five years ago and opened an office for his fledgling hedge-fund firm, Wood River Capital Management, named for the picturesque river that runs through Ketchum.
Locals describe Whittier as an absent-minded-professor type who drives a Lincoln Navigator and sometimes fetches his morning coffee from a Tully's café in his pajamas. Beyond that he keeps to himself, they say. Investors in Wood River's funds apparently didn't know much about Whittier, either. The ex-stock analyst at investment bank Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette presented himself as a savvy stock trader overseeing hundreds of millions of dollars for investors. Marketing materials for his flagship fund trumpet 25% returns in the first eight months of this year, a period when the stock market was basically flat.
But some investors got nervous and tried -- unsuccessfully -- to get their money back late last month when Whittier's big bet on an obscure Silicon Valley stock slumped badly, say investors' lawyers. The firm stopped answering its phone. Last week, Wood River's offices in downtown Ketchum were locked and apparently unoccupied. FedEx packages piled up outside next to strollers and a red wagon left by Whittier's two young children.
Wood River is now the subject of a preliminary investigation by the Securities & Exchange Commission -- the latest hedge-fund scandal that is sure to intensify calls for greater government oversight of these lightly regulated investment pools. Only two weeks ago the founders of collapsed Bayou Management, a hedge fund in Stamford, Conn., pled guilty to criminal fraud.
As in the Bayou affair, Wood River presented red flags that careful investors should have noticed. The firms Wood River's promoters named as its outside auditor and bookkeeper, for example, say flatly that they didn't provide those services to the hedge fund. Morgan Stanley (MWD ), listed in April as one of the hedge fund's two prime brokers, in fact was not, according to a person familiar with the matter...
Labels: Bayou Group, John Whittier, Morgan Stanley, Wood River Capital
U.S. hedge funds may slip past SEC, research shows
October 3, 2005
By Svea Herbst-Bayliss
Reuters
Hundreds of U.S. hedge funds may slip through the crack when they register with regulators, new research shows, causing a humiliating if not harmful situation as authorities begin to scrutinize the industry more closely. Life will change for thousands of loosely regulated hedge funds in February, when they must follow a new rule designed to reduce fraud in the hugely popular and often secretive $1 trillion industry. Funds that manage $30 million or more for 15 or more clients must register with the Securities and Exchange Commission and let the agency's inspectors review the hedge fund's books at any time.
With less than four months to go before the new rule takes effect, however, independent researchers, lawyers and even SEC officials said the agency's limited resources will be stretched dramatically, and some funds will not face the extra scrutiny -- at least not immediately. "We expect that some 1,900 hedge funds will plan to register with the SEC before February and that the agency will get bottlenecked, which means that a lot of hedge funds will be registered by default," Brian Shapiro, president of Carbon360, the research arm of CarbonBased Consulting, told Reuters.
Traditionally, the SEC has 45 days to accept or reject an advisor's package. But because so many hedge funds are waiting until the last minute to apply, the agency may not eye all the documents in time, lawyers said, agreeing with the research. "I think this is going to cause a traffic jam," said Paul Roth, partner at law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel, explaining some funds' applications may become effective without review. More problematic, however, could be what happens after the fund is registered, the researchers said.
Usually, the SEC conducts an audit within the first year of registration, which Carbon360 has calculated means the agency will have to review an additional 158 funds per month, tying up two examiners for four weeks on each one. SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins said last week that the agency may not be able to keep up. "We have neither the resources nor the expertise to oversee all of the potential new registrants," he told the hedge fund industry's lobby group MFA in a speech. Carbon360 based its research on public SEC documents and released it during the same week when the founders of collapsed hedge fund Bayou Group pleaded guilty to fraud, marking the latest industry blow-up. Federal and state investigators are still probing how the pair cheated investors out of an estimated $300 million.
For the SEC, admitting to staff shortages may be especially embarrassing after it worked for years to put the fast-growing industry on a tighter leash as pension funds, endowments and charities pour billions into hedge funds every year. If fund managers know the SEC's resources are stretched, the researchers said the agency's ability to protect the public may be watered down because managers will have less fear of being caught if they commit fraud. "Essentially, the SEC could fall flat in its defense of the public interest if the agency is as overwhelmed as we suspect it may be," Shapiro said. The SEC acknowledged the problem, but warned it will be vigilant nonetheless.
"Resource contraints don't allow us to have a cop on every corner," SEC spokesman John Nester said. "We must therefore use our existing resources as efficiently and effectively as possible, and identify the highest risk areas that warrant scrutiny by SEC examiners." Industry lawyers, meanwhile, said that letting a few funds slip through the cracks during the registration process will not be very harmful. "The registration form isn't where you catch bad people. The examination process is where you catch bad people," said Elizabeth Fries, partner at law firm Goodwin Procter. Schulte Roth & Zabel's Roth agreed. "If some funds become effective without being reviewed, they will be reviewed later. It does not seem to be a particular problem," Paul Roth said.
The original article appears here.
-- MDT
Labels: Bayou Group
Why regulators are looking at hedge funds and derivatives -- and how they could affect you.The original article appears here.
September 24, 2005
By Amanda Cantrell
CNN/Money staff writer
NEW YORK (CNN/Money) - In the summer blockbuster "War of the Worlds," ordinary Americans are forced to run for their lives when alien invaders wreak havoc on their planet. What the victims didn't know was that the seeds for the attack had been germinating beneath their feet for years.
While that was a movie, some financial regulators fear that a less dramatic but similar scenario could be developing in the nation's financial markets. Their target? Two key segments of the markets -- hedge funds and credit derivatives -- that have been mostly invisible to many ordinary investors but have grown to massive proportions in recent years.
What's making regulators take notice now? Many complex factors, but it boils down to this: those pieces of the capital markets have grown so big so fast, and are so complicated, that any problems could mushroom and spark big losses -- and huge volatility -- for investors around the world. Hedge funds now manage an estimated $1 trillion in assets worldwide, and in some cases, a single fund can account for a big chunk of the volume on some exchanges. (For more on hedge funds, click here).
The credit derivatives market has swelled to an estimated $8.4 trillion -- that's trillion with a 't' -- and regulators are concerned about trading in these largely unregulated investments. (For more on credit derivatives and how they work, click here.) "Credit derivatives and hedge funds have grown fairly spectacularly over the last five years," said Andrew Lo, director of the MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering and a managing member at the hedge fund Alpha Simplex Group.
"There are enormous amounts of capital that have come in and are being deployed in fairly highly leveraged transactions. We don't know the exact amount of leverage being used, and there's even less data about credit derivatives market," he said. Because of this rapid growth, regulators are concerned that if something happens in the credit derivatives space, such as several companies defaulting on their debt at once, this would affect not just hedge funds but could unnerve financial markets, and affect interest rates and the broader economy.
To be sure, big losses from a series of credit defaults or hedge fund blowups would hurt mostly big investors on Wall Street, but with more and more pension funds putting money into hedge funds, average workers and investors could also suffer. Concerns about the credit derivatives, which derive their value from underlying corporate bonds, prompted the New York Federal Reserve to meet with several Wall Street firms recently.
The regulators want to make sure that if several companies default on their debt at once or in rapid succession, the financial markets could handle the losses and selling in the derivatives market, without sparking a broader round of panic selling on Wall Street. Two complex derivatives -- credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations -- have become especially popular with hedge fund investors in recent years.
People familiar with the matter say regulators want to ensure that the players in the market have enough money to live up to their obligations. And they want to encourage orderly growth in these exotic investments to help curtail the risks of a "systemic" shock to the financial markets. While regulators are shining their lights on the credit derivatives market, this doesn't mean the regulatory scrutiny for hedge funds will lighten up any time soon.
Christopher Cox, the new chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, told the Wall Street Journal recently that he plans to forge ahead with a new rule requiring the funds to register with the SEC as investment advisers. While some on Wall Street had speculated Cox might reconsider the rule, many others weren't surprised. The new rule came from ex-SEC chief William Donaldson, who initiated a two-year review of hedge funds and pushed the rule through despite a divided commission, which narrowly passed it by a 3-2 vote.
Cox's decision to go ahead comes as federal and state officials investigate the collapse of Bayou Management, a Stamford, Conn.-based hedge fund. Federal prosecutors have accused the fund of raising $300 million from investors by lying to investors about returns and their funds' performance. Officials have seized $100 million believed to belong to Bayou investors.
Labels: Bayou Group
Want a Hedge Fund? Here's Your HomeworkThe original article appears here.
By Geraldine Fabrikant
New York Times
September 11, 2005
IF you're thinking about investing in a hedge fund, how can you steer clear of the likes of the Bayou Group, the recently imploded hedge fund company and brokerage firm run by Samuel Israel III? Unfortunately, getting information about individual hedge funds isn't easy.
While hedge funds have generally had positive returns, experts point out that some of them can be big money losers - and that this makes the decision to invest in any single fund a very risky business. A variety of databases provide information about hedge funds, but they are by no means infallible, and in any case many of them are often unavailable to the average investor.
The collapse of Bayou is a case in point. Federal prosecutors in Manhattan sued Bayou on Sept. 1, saying the company had defrauded investors since 1998 by misrepresenting the fund's performance. The complaint said that Bayou had misstated its assets and that its books, which it had claimed were evaluated by independent auditors, were certified by a bogus accounting firm whose registered agent, Daniel Marino, was also the chief financial officer of Bayou.
The case against Bayou began to develop in May, when Arizona authorities seized $101 million held by a man to whom Mr. Israel had turned it over in a seemingly desperate effort to make some fast money to cover his fund's losses.
For hedge fund investors determined to avoid such debacles, there are some free Web sites that offer data on legal and financial developments, including the sites of the Securities and Exchange Commission (www.sec.gov) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (www.nasd.com). While such sites contain a wealth of information, the often do not include the most telling signs of trouble in a hedge fund.
Randy Shain, the co-founder of BackTrack Reports, which researches hedge funds for institutions and some wealthy individuals, says that in the Bayou case, several red flags - including questions about Mr. Israel's character - would not have been evident to people contemplating an investment in the fund. For example, it would have been difficult to learn from publicly available data that Mr. Israel had exaggerated his position at one hedge fund, had been charged with drunken driving and had been accused in a lawsuit by a former employee of violating securities regulations.
A litany of problems like this is hardly typical of hedge fund managers, but it does underscore how difficult it is to vet a fund, said Charles Stevenson, a veteran hedge fund manager who now runs the Navigator Diversified Strategies fund, which is a fund of hedge funds. (A fund of funds is a group of individual hedge funds that has been assembled by a third party, an arrangement that provides diversification and, perhaps, a margin of safety.) "If a manager's character is not reliable enough for you to trust them with your wallet," Mr. Stevenson said, "then the returns will be less relevant than whether they actually return any of your money."
In promotional material for the Bayou funds, Mr. Israel told investors that he had worked as the head trader at Omega Advisors, a hedge fund run by Leon Cooperman, a former Goldman Sachs partner. But Mr. Israel had misrepresented the length of his employment at Omega as well as his position there, Mr. Cooperman said in an interview. Mr. Israel had worked there as a trader for 18 months, but had not been there for four years as the head trader as he had claimed, Mr. Cooperman said.
Many hedge funds do not have a public relations operation geared toward answering such questions raised by outsiders. Would Mr. Cooperman have taken a call about Mr. Israel's credentials from a prospective investor in the Bayou funds? "I can't answer that," Mr. Cooperman said. "If somebody calls me for a reference check, I will respond factually and appropriately. But certain firms are very cautious about talking about former employees."
Another cautionary piece of news for Bayou investors should have been that while Omega oversees two funds of hedge funds that invest money with 25 different managers, Mr. Israel's group wasn't among them. "We never invested in Sam Israel's hedge fund nor did one trade with his securities company," Mr. Cooperman said.
Promotional materials also stated that Mr. Israel began his career at F. J. Graber & Company, a money management firm geared "toward high-velocity trading" and run by its founder, Fredric Graber. One person who knew both men, but requested anonymity, recalled that Mr. Israel had worked for Mr. Graber as a summer intern, a position arranged through a family friend, but added that Mr. Israel "never had a leadership role" at the firm. Mr. Graber, who closed his firm some years ago, could not be reached for comment.
Potential investors might also have been concerned if they had learned other information. Mr. Israel had been arrested in New York State in 1999 and accused of "driving under the influence" and charged with criminal possession of a "controlled substance," Mr. Shain of BackTrack Reports said; the case was discontinued a year later. That case was reported without elaboration on LexisNexis, a subscription data base, where Mr. Shain's firm found it while researching Bayou for a potential investor. In order to get details about the case, Mr. Shain had to send a researcher to State Supreme Court in Manhattan.
Sometimes red flags are more immediately visible. The documents that Bayou made available to its investors say that Richmond-Fairfield Associates was Bayou's accounting firm. Charles Levenberg, a private investigator who researches hedge funds, said that lack of information about the accounting firm was a warning sign. "If they are not using somebody you have heard of, that is a big red flag," he said. "You have to wonder why." The government has contended that Richmond-Fairfield was controlled by Bayou.
Evidence of possible problems can sometimes be uncovered in news reports. James R. Hedges IV, a partner at the Imperium Partners Group, a hedge fund based in New York, recalled that in 2002 his firm was looking into an investment in the Lancer Group, a hedge fund based in Manhattan. But Mr. Hedges said he had seen a news report about a lawsuit filed in Federal District Court in Miami that same year in which the S.E.C. had accused Bruce Cowen, a managing director of the Lancer Group, of participating in a conspiracy to divert funds from Lancer investors and, ultimately, funnel some of it to his own pocket. That information "told us to stay away" from the Lancer Group, Mr. Hedges said.
A year later, the S.E.C. accused the Lancer Group of inflating the net asset values of its funds in an effort to mislead auditors and attract investors. The agency continues to seek fines, permanent injunctions against the group and penalties. For investors who are intent on picking hedge funds themselves, despite the risks, experts say that it may pay to subscribe to services that track lawsuits. For example, an investor can subscribe to Pacer, an online index to federal civil, criminal and bankruptcy cases nationwide.
A Pacer subscriber could have found that a suit was filed against Bayou in 2003 in Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana by a former employee, Paul T. Westervelt Jr., and his son. The plaintiffs contended that Bayou had failed to provide them with necessary business documents and that Mr. Westervelt discovered "possible violations of the S.E.C. regulations governing the operating of hedge funds."
The case has moved from federal court to arbitration. Lawyers on both sides did not return phone calls seeking comment. In 2004, Mr. Israel wrote to investors telling them of the suit. But an earlier warning of a former employee's decision to sue the company might have been helpful to investors. The problem for individual investors is that many of them "have made a lot of money doing something else," Mr. Shain said. "They have a false sense of security about their own sophistication in analyzing financials," he added.
To winnow out potential problems, investors may want to look for some common-sense warning signs. In addition to checking for evidence of possible deception or illegality, some analysts say they try to check whether the manager is in the midst of a difficult divorce, as Mr. Israel was, which can add psychological and financial pressures.
One basic metric is the manager's employment record. Michael Steinhardt, a manager who ran his own fund for 29 years and is now starting a group of exchange-traded funds, said, "A long track record is the best endorsement." In 1997, a fund run by Barbara Doran, who had previously been an institutional equity sales executive at First Boston and then a senior vice president at Lehman Brothers, shut its doors after losing 80 percent of its value. Ms. Doran had started the fund just three years earlier. At its height it was worth only $35 million. Ms. Doran declined to comment last week.
Of course, big financial institutions have made bad bets on hedge funds, too. Through a fund offered by an investment unit, J. P. Morgan had $662,602 in Bayou as of March 31, which it has written down to zero. A spokeswoman for J. P. Morgan said that as a result of the investigation, the firm was no longer marketing the fund to investors. But over all, the odds favor big institutions. "They have a better chance of weeding out the problem funds," Mr. Shain said.
Labels: Bayou Group, Louisiana, Milberg
Rescuing the data from the morassThe original article appears here.
H.J. Cummins
Star Tribune
Published September 11, 2005
There's still mud as thick as gumbo roux in and around much of New Orleans. But as people begin thinking beyond survival to recovery, some are wading into their businesses to salvage the records they will need to start over. Don't think muddy file cabinets. They're as outdated as the rotary phone. Think computers -- specifically, the hard drives inside them whose spinning disks are now the repository of everything from employee pay scales to customer addresses to the secret formula to the company's success.
Last week, the first of the drives pulled from the bayou muck started arriving at Kroll Ontrack, a data-recovery company based in Eden Prairie. Kroll Ontrack is a unit of Kroll Inc., which is part of risk consultant Marsh & McLennan Co., both based in New York. A crescendo of phone calls started up, too, mostly from people asking, if they get their hard drives up to Kroll Ontrack, is there any hope of retrieving anything on them?
At least one business had the bad luck of Hurricane Katrina hitting both its headquarters and its backup storage site, said Jim Reinert, senior director of software and services at Kroll Ontrack. "It was just such a huge storm," Reinert said. When those calls come in, he is in fact very encouraging. "Every case is different, but in general we expect those drives to be highly recoverable," he said. "Even if they're buried in nasty water, they are mostly recoverable."
The first thing Kroll Ontrack does is advise customers how to handle the drives: Don't try to turn on the computer. Package them like they were fine china. And don't let them dry out -- a sealed plastic bag usually does the trick. At the Eden Prairie laboratories, the drives go through diagnostics to find out how many files have survived. Much of the cleaning needs to be done in a special "clean room," where air quality, temperature and humidity are hyper-controlled. A speck of dust can disable the disks.
The company manages to retrieve part or all of almost 90 percent of the drives that come through, said Jeff Pederson, manager of data recovery operations. Floods and fires often do less damage than internal problems, such as another part of the hard drive hitting the disks, Pederson said. The files under any scrape are gone, he said. Kroll Ontrack retrieved 99 percent of the contents of two laptop drives from the space shuttle Columbia, which broke apart in its return to Earth in February 2003. The drives were found at the bottom of a lake, Reinert said. Some of the other requests coming from the Gulf region involve recorded tapes, still the most common form of backup, Pederson said.
One credit union got its tapes safely out of New Orleans, he said, but then had to bring them to Kroll because it didn't have the equipment to run them. Kroll Ontrack transfers the recovered files to CDs, DVDs or external hard drives. For some idea of the volume of information involved, the company explained: The typical drive comes in with about 20 gigabytes of data. It would take more than 4 million sheets of paper to cover that much material. Those sheets, in a stack, would be taller than the Empire State Building.
For a standard PC or laptop, the company charges about $100 for the diagnosis and $1,000 to recover files, Reinert said. Prices vary for more complicated drives and for batches of 20, 50 or more drives from a client company. The diagnosis usually takes a day or two. The whole process, start to finish, usually takes two to five days. Kroll Ontrack is gearing up for a jump in business because of the hurricane, though Reinert said they really don't know yet what to expect. "It could be hundreds of jobs, or thousands; it's too soon to know," he said. "But our business usually tracks with the recovery in cases like this, so we're looking at months, for sure."
Labels: Bayou Group, China, Kroll